ABSTRACT
The research is motivated by the need to determine the impact of South Africa's COVID-19 regulations on its quality of democracy. It takes into account the interests of individual (liberal) rights in competition with the state's interests of public security. Theoretical assumptions, based on classical democratic theories, which rely on the separation of powers and checks-and-balance principles, were used. The South African government architecture is assessed, especially in the context of accountability and oversight requirements. For this purpose, the relationship between the legislature and executive is most relevant. The South African government decided on a state of disaster to manage the pandemic, but it is contrasted with a state of emergency as the constitutional alternative. Its implementation, especially the institutional framework used for it, is analysed. The role of Parliament during the pandemic is used as an important test of the quality of democracy. The conclusions are that South Africa's democratic principles did not degenerate during the pandemic, as concluded by Freedom House, but the pandemic's major impact was on the quality of democracy. The state of disaster's institutions, for example, were not those prescribed by legislation. Moreover, Parliament's involvement in the state of disaster's decision-making was limited. The 2021 local government election, on the other hand, was judged free and fair and its outcomes have been implemented without any public challenges. The main negative outcome is the public's trust deficit in the ANC government's use and abuse of pandemic regulations.